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Live and Let Die: The Consequences of Oklahoma’s 
Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act  
Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of 
an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud 
death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme 
consequence. 
— Justice William Brennan1 
I. Introduction 
In 2013, the Oklahoma legislature passed the Oklahoma 
Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act (the Act).2 This Act further 
complicates the already complicated landscape of medical futility by 
restricting physicians’ ability to adhere to ethical obligations and make 
decisions in accordance with their own professional consciences. The 
legislature did this with almost no political discussion in a state with no 
reported medical futility or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment appellate 
cases. The Act3 raises the issue of medical futility, which in this context, 
refers to the situation where a patient or their surrogate decision maker 
demands treatment and a physician refuses to administer that treatment on 
the basis that it provides no medical benefit.4 The Act forbids physicians 
from deciding not to extend the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill 
individual through life-sustaining treatment (LST) if (1) the decision is 
based on the view that these patients’ lives are of lower value than other 
patients because of one of these traits or (2) there is a disagreement between 
the physician and proxy regarding treatment.5 Under a plain-language 
standard of interpretation, the Act could require a physician to administer 
treatment to a patient even though doing so could, in her medical opinion, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310-11 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 2. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3090 (Supp. 2014). 
 3. “A health care provider shall not deny to a patient a life-preserving health care 
service the provider provides to other patients, and the provision of which is directed by the 
patient or a person legally authorized to make health care decisions for the patient . . . .” Id. § 
3090.3. 
 4. Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 221, 221-22 (1995). 
 5. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3090.3. 
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ultimately cause harm to the patient and conflict with her professional 
conscience. The Act further constrains physicians by preventing them from 
considering all aspects of their patient’s condition and treating them on a 
case-by-case basis because the Act implies that age, disability, and terminal 
illness cannot be considered when making this value judgment.6 The Act 
also deters physicians from presenting patients or surrogate decision makers 
with all available medical options, including discontinuation of treatment, 
for fear of violating this statute. Finally, the Act inhibits the ability of 
doctors and may cause physicians to flee the state.  
This Comment first addresses the landscape of medical futility and 
patients’ rights by discussing relevant case law, the roles of physicians, and 
advanced directives. Next, it discusses the background, text, and 
consequences of Oklahoma’s Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act. Then, it 
presents statutes from Idaho and Texas and contrasts them with the 
Oklahoma Act. Finally, this Comment proposes a statutory model, which 
borrows from the Texas Advanced Directive Act (TADA), to replace the 
current Act in Oklahoma. This proposal would defer disputes between 
physicians and patient/surrogate decision makers to an ethics committee, 
while always leaving open an option to transfer the patient to another 
facility as a last resort.  
The scope of this Comment is limited to the denial of LST as addressed 
in Oklahoma’s Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act. The Comment does 
not address legally brain-dead individuals and the ethical dilemma of 
denying them treatment, as brain-dead individuals cannot receive LST.7 It 
also does not discuss the Act’s effect on disagreements between family 
members of a patient. This Comment will focus on the decisions made by 
physicians and the disagreements between physicians and patients/surrogate 
decision makers as to the proper treatment of patients suffering from 
illnesses where LST is an option, and how the Act affects these decisions 
and disagreements.  
This Comment assumes that conflicts will arise most often, if not always, 
between a surrogate decision maker and a physician (rather than the patient 
and a physician). In treatment decisions, physicians often defer to the 
wishes of the patient, especially when the patient is able to articulate those 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. § 3090.3(A)(1).  
 7. Life sustaining treatment does just that—it sustains life. Brain-dead individuals, 
however, are no longer alive under the laws of Oklahoma so they cannot receive treatment 
that could sustain life. Uniform Determination of Death Act, 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3122 (2011). 
However, brain dead individuals can receive futile treatment as medical treatment provides 
no medical benefit to them.  
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decisions themselves. However, when the patient is unable to make 
decisions, or has failed to indicate her wishes in an advanced directive, 
treatment decisions are much more difficult to make because no guidance is 
available. When the doctor does not know the patient’s wishes and the 
decision is left up to a surrogate decision maker, conflicts can arise between 
what the surrogate decision maker wants or thinks the patient would have 
wanted and what the physician thinks is the best course of treatment. Since 
patient autonomy is so valued in the medical field, a clash at the bedside 
between doctors and a patient actually able to make medical decisions 
would probably occur much less often in regard to discontinuing LST for 
medical futility reasons than the clash between doctors and family members 
of patients unable to make these decisions. This paper proceeds under this 
assumption.  
II. The Landscape of Medical Futility and Patient Rights 
The Act, while it does not specifically address medical futility, concerns 
medical futility because it states that physicians are restricted from denying 
LST under certain conditions.8 The concept of medical futility is ancient,9 
but physicians have only recently turned away from pushing aggressive 
treatment to using the court system to help them discontinue LST based on 
medical futility. The medical and technological advances have outpaced the 
public’s understanding of life and death as well as the legislative response 
to properly addressing medical futility issues and LST.10 Medical advances 
have saved lives, but, unfortunately, they have also left us with “living” 
individuals in their end stages with no quality of life. Physicians struggle to 
ethically treat these patients—attempting to carry out patients’ wishes while 
trying to do no harm. LST can prolong life but often at the high cost of pain 
and suffering.  
While LST can extend life, it often does so while causing the body to 
deteriorate severely. As an example, consider Barbara Howe. Howe 
received LST for Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), during which she 
suffered a rapid decline in bodily functions and the ability to 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See, e.g., id. § 3090.3. 
 9. LAWRENCE J. SCHNEIDERMAN, EMBRACING OUR MORTALITY: HARD CHOICES IN AN 
AGE OF MEDICAL MIRACLES 118 (2008) [hereinafter EMBRACING MORTALITY]; LAWRENCE J. 
SCHNEIDERMAN & NANCY S. JECKER, WRONG MEDICINE: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND FUTILE 
TREATMENT 6 (2d ed. 2011). 
 10. See SCHNEIDERMAN & JECKER, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
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communicate.11 As her physicians continued to administer LST, Howe 
alerted them to her severe pain until she was unable to communicate, 
reducing her to episodes of “prolonged sobbing.”12 As the disease 
progressed, Howe lost the ability to lubricate her eyes, eventually forcing 
doctors to remove her right eye.13 She suffered rib fractures, a broken 
humerus bone (both discovered by chance from an unrelated x-ray), cuts to 
her face, and osteoporosis, among several other ailments, all while she wore 
a permanent grimace on her face.14 Watching Howe suffer tormented her 
doctors and caregivers.15 Finally, the Optimum Care Committee (OCC) of 
the hospital met and announced that “this inhumane travesty has gone far 
enough. This is the Massachusetts General Hospital, not Auschwitz.”16 
They released the following statement: 
They [the Hospital staff] have lived for two years with the 
appalling realization that they are under orders to resuscitate her 
and so guarantee that her gallant life will be wiped out by a 
senseless act of brutality. The administrative mandate demands 
that the dimension of emotion in their care be shut out, 
repressed, stamped on, derogated, or just plain pretended away. 
It is therefore not only delusional but unfair. It demands that the 
entire body of caregivers violate their professional oaths, the 
standards of medical and nursing practice, the standards of the 
Massachusetts General Hospital, and the standards of ethics, 
morality, human decency and common sense.17 
When facing treatment decisions like Howe’s, many ask the question: 
what have I got to lose? People view illnesses as a fight or a battle. We say 
things about the ill like “she’s strong” or “she’s a fighter.” This perspective 
of sickness makes us view dying as losing this fight or giving up. People 
ask, “What have I got to lose?” because whether you lose your battle, or 
you just give up on it, the end is the same: death. Few realize, however, that 
while all of our lives certainly end in death at some point, as Plato said, 
                                                                                                                 
 11. In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *2 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Mar. 
22, 2004). 
 12. Id. at *6; see also Patrick Moore, Note, An End-of-Life Quandary in Need of a 
Statutory Response: When Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment That Physicians Are 
Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. REV. 433, 434-35 (2007). 
 13. Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *10-11; Moore, supra note 12, at 435. 
 14. Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *12-13; Moore, supra note 12, at 435. 
 15. Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *8.  
 16. Id. at *11.  
 17. Id. at *12; Moore, supra note 12, at 435. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/4
2016]       COMMENT 589 
 
 
“death is not the worst that can happen to men.”18 So what do individuals 
have to lose from receiving medical treatment? They can lose their dignity. 
They can be put in constant, horrible pain. They can lose the ability to say 
goodbye to their loved ones while wasting away in a cold, sterile intensive 
care unit room.19 The danger of ignoring medical futility lies in requiring 
physicians to provide medical treatment when they believe it will result in 
tragic consequences. Physicians should not be forced to facilitate a painful, 
undignified end.  
The danger of the Oklahoma Act, if interpreted through a plain-language 
approach, is that it requires physicians to render treatment that potentially 
causes their patients to suffer as their health declines. Given courts’ record 
of interpreting statutes in medical futility cases under a plain-language 
approach20 and the pervasive pro-life landscape in Oklahoma, a court faced 
with this statute will likely adopt a plain-language interpretation over 
alternative approaches, such as purposive or original intent.  
A. Case Law Regarding Medical Decision-Making Rights 
The following three cases highlight the rights courts have recognized in 
patients and doctors, as well as how courts have treated disputes between 
them.21 The first two cases arose when aggressive treatment was the most 
acceptable treatment in the medical field. In re Quinlan was the first case to 
recognize the common-law right to discontinue life support—and did so 
even though the case involved a decision by a proxy decision maker.22 
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, a later 
case, recognized the same right but rooted it in the constitutional right to 
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.23 Finally, 
In re Baby K, the most recent of the three, involved a medical futility 
dispute where the hospital used the courts to decide whether LST could be 
discontinued for medical futility reasons.24  
  
                                                                                                                 
 18. Jon D. Feldhammer, Note, Medical Torture: End of Life Decision-Making in the 
United Kingdom and United States, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511, 511 (2006) 
(quoting Plato).  
 19. See id. at 512. 
 20. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 21. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Baby 
K, 16 F.3d 590; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 22. 355 A.2d at 53. 
 23. 497 U.S. at 262. 
 24. 16 F.3d at 598. 
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1. In re Quinlan 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided Quinlan in 1976.25 This case 
concerned a father who sought guardianship over his twenty-two-year-old 
daughter in order to discontinue her life support.26 The daughter, Karen 
Quinlan, was a persistently vegetative patient stuck permanently into a rigid 
fetal position with no chance of recovery.27 The court, expressing sadness, 
held first that Karen could no longer competently choose whether to stay on 
life support or discontinue it and second, that a guardian could assert the 
choice for her.28 The physicians in this case did not believe that Karen 
should be taken off life support, but Karen’s father was ultimately 
appointed by the court to be her guardian with the power to remove her 
from life support, and he did so.29 
Quinlan is premised on the idea that patients have a common-law right to 
refuse treatment. It also showed that proxy decision makers can assert a 
patient’s wishes on their behalf and that courts can override physician 
judgment based on the professional standard of care. This case was decided 
in 1976, however, and there have been many subsequent developments in 
how we understand and use medical technology, the standard of care, and 
medical futility.  
2. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health  
The Supreme Court decided Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health in 1990.30 This case arose after Nancy Cruzan was 
injured in a car accident and ended up in a persistent vegetative state due to 
a sustained lack of oxygen.31 Cruzan had motor reflexes but no sign of 
cognitive function.32 Cruzan’s parents wished to withdraw LST by 
terminating her artificial nutrition and hydration; the hospital, however, 
refused to do so because it would cause her death.33 Based on Cruzan’s 
prior statements, her parents believed that if she had the choice, she would 
want to discontinue LST.34  
                                                                                                                 
 25. 355 A.3d at 647. 
 26. Id. at 651. 
 27. Id. at 656.  
 28. Id. at 664, 671. 
 29. Id. at 672.  
 30. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 31. Id. at 265-66. 
 32. Id. at 266.  
 33. Id. at 265, 268. 
 34. Id. at 268. 
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The Supreme Court considered whether Cruzan “ha[d] a right under the 
United States Constitution[,] which would require the hospital to withdraw 
life-sustaining treatment from her . . . .”35 The Court drew on the common-
law elements of battery and the informed-consent doctrine to demonstrate 
that a patient has a right to refuse treatment.36 The Court determined that, 
implicit within the Fourteenth Amendment’s word “liberty,” exists the 
historic right of a patient to refuse treatments such as vaccines and 
antipsychotic drugs.37 The Court proclaimed that “[t]he principle that a 
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”38 
Rather than announce that the right to refuse medical treatment includes the 
right to refuse LST generally, the Court stated that “for purposes of this 
case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a 
competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving 
hydration and nutrition.”39 While the Court limited this declaration to the 
facts of Cruzan, subsequent decisions applied this statement broadly.40  
Cruzan reiterated the importance of a patient’s right to refuse medical 
treatment, even if that refusal results in death, and found a basis for this in 
the Constitution. A problematic question unanswered in this case is whether 
there is a right to demand treatment just as there is a right to refuse it.  
3. In re Baby K 
After In re Wanglie41 was decided as the first medical futility case, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the landmark case of In re Baby K 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. at 269. 
 36. Id. at 269-70. 
 37. Id. at 278. 
 38. Id. (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 279. 
 40. See, e.g., Sama v. Hannigan, 669 F.3d 585, 591 (5th Cir. 2012); Raich v. Gonzales, 
500 F.3d 850, 864 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007); Blouin v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 359 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 41. In re Wanglie was the first medical futility case decided by a court. Jerry Menikoff, 
Demanded Medical Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1096 (1998). Helga Wanglie broke her hip 
and became dependent on a respirator. Id. She then had a heart attack and was diagnosed as 
being in a persistent vegetative state. Id. Her doctors recommended discontinuation of LST 
(taking her off the respirator), but her husband disagreed arguing that to remove her from her 
respirator would be playing God, and later that she wanted all LST measures to be taken. Id. 
The hospital asked a court to have an independent guardian appointed to make Wanglie’s 
medical decisions rather than her husband, but the court refused. Id. This case is an example 
of substituted judgment (the husband possibly substituting his judgment for that of his 
wife’s), as well as an example of the hospital going to the courts for a declaratory judgment. 
Id.  
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in 1994.42 Baby K was born with anencephaly, which is “a congenital 
malformation in which a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp are 
missing.”43 Baby K lacked a cerebrum, causing permanent 
unconsciousness, but had a working brain stem, which allowed her to still 
have autonomic functions.44 Due to breathing difficulties, Baby K was put 
on a respirator, and because she could not see, hear, or interact with her 
environment, doctors encouraged her mother to agree to a “Do Not 
Resuscitate Order” (DNR) so that lifesaving procedures would be withheld 
in the event that Baby K required resuscitation, as most anencephalic 
infants die shortly after birth due to complications.45 Ms. H, Baby K’s 
mother, did not agree with the doctors and wanted the hospital to place 
Baby K on a respirator whenever there was breathing difficulty.46 Baby K 
was transferred to a nursing home but was readmitted to the hospital three 
times due to the breathing difficulties.47 Because the hospital found this 
treatment “medically and ethically inappropriate,” the hospital asked a court 
to decide whether it was obligated to provide medical treatment to Baby 
K.48  
The court based its decision in the language of the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). Congress enacted EMTALA to 
prevent hospitals from “dumping” patients who were unable to pay for 
emergency medical treatment.49 Additionally, EMTALA requires hospitals 
to treat patients diagnosed with an emergency medical condition.50 Because 
EMLATA required stabilizing care for infants, the court required the 
hospital to give Baby K mechanical ventilation to keep her in a stable 
condition.51 The court, however, acknowledged there were problems with 
its decision:  
We recognize the dilemma facing physicians who are requested 
to provide treatment they consider morally and ethically 
inappropriate, but we cannot ignore the plain language of the 
                                                                                                                 
 42. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 43. Id. at 592. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 592-93. 
 46. Id. at 593. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 593-94. 
 51. Id. at 594. 
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statute because “to do so would ‘transcend our judicial 
function.’”52 
The court used a plain-language approach when interpreting EMLATA. 
If a court applied the same approach to the Oklahoma Act, it would ignore 
the ethical dilemma physicians face acknowledged in Baby K because the 
Act, as written, drastically restricts physicians and their ability not to 
provide treatment they deem morally and ethically inappropriate.  
4. The Foundations of Medical Futility  
These cases show that courts heavily consider the right to refuse 
treatment, as well as the intent and desires of the patient or the guardians 
when deciding disputes about discontinuing LST. Quinlan acknowledges 
that patients have a fundamental right to refuse treatment based in common 
law, and Cruzan shows that this fundamental right is anchored in the 
Constitution.53 Thus, the patient’s wishes usually supersede other opinions 
on care when refusing treatment. The Supreme Court, however, has not 
addressed the right to demand treatment.  
B. Medically Futile Treatment—A Term with Infinite Definitions  
Medical futility is a concept that is difficult to define, and the statutory 
definitions adopted by states have differed substantially.54 Medical futility 
seems to be made up of two concepts: scientific futility and ethical futility. 
Scientific futility embodies the components of medical futility such as 
treatment “of no medical benefit,”55 “life-sustaining measures . . . 
becom[ing] so painful as to be abusive,”56 or medically ineffective 
treatment.57 In contrast, ethical futility considers the resultant quality of life 
and whether such treatment is ethical under the rules of the medical 
profession. Thus, treatment can be medically futile if it either fails to 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 596 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 53. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261-62 (1990); In 
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 652 (N. J. 1976). 
 54. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4514 (West 2014). 
 55. Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's 
Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1242 (1993). 
 56. Id. at 1250 (quoting Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Court Bars Efforts to End Life 
Support for Stricken Girl, 13, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at A10). 
 57. Daar, supra note 4, at 230. 
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overcome the illness at hand or makes the patient’s quality of life worse 
than withholding treatment.58 
Medical futility is controversial because it invariably requires a 
subjective value judgment.59 It is not an objective medical standard because 
it requires a physician to determine whether treatment is futile using 
personal values and medical judgment.60 The concept of medical futility is 
particularly important in the context of LST, and thus the Act, because there 
are times when even prolonging life with LST can prove futile in the 
physician’s expert opinion.  
The physician has a responsibility to render a certain standard of care to 
patients, and therefore, a physician must determine whether LST is 
medically futile and thus would fall below that standard of care.61 The 
American Medical Association Code states that while a patient’s judgment 
should sometimes prevail over that of the physician, a physician is not 
required to deliver care simply because a patient demands a treatment.62 
Moreover, a physician is not required to deliver care that has no reasonable 
chance of benefiting the patient.63 However, if a physician does not render 
treatment that conforms to the standard of care, then she opens herself to 
liability.64 While the Act only allows for an injunctive remedy, if a court 
decided this legislation required futile treatment, it could establish a new 
standard of care for the state, possibly one that subjects physicians to 
another source liability. If giving every treatment imaginable that a family 
demands becomes the standard as a result of the Act, then if doctors fail to 
do so, they could find themselves subject to negligence actions or other 
medical malpractice liability.  
                                                                                                                 
 58. See Howard Brody, Medical Futility: a Useful Concept?, in MEDICAL FUTILITY AND 
THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS 1, 2 (Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard 
D. Zucker eds., 1997). 
 59. See Meir Katz, When Is Medical Care "Futile"? The Institutional Competence of the 
Medical Profession Regarding the Provision of Life-Sustaining Medical Care, 90 NEB. L. 
REV. 1, 25-26 (2011). 
 60. Id.  
 61. Lisa L. Dahm, Medical Futility and the Texas Medical Futility Statute: A Model to 
Follow or One to Avoid?, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2008, at 25, 26.  
 62. Id. at 26.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Meghan C. O'Connor, The Physician-Patient Relationship and the Professional 
Standard of Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principles to Achieve the Goals of Tort 
Reform, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 109, 117 (2010). 
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Other states protect physicians’ ability to refuse to render futile care.65 
The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (UHCDA) provides that “[a] 
health-care provider or institution may decline to comply with an individual 
instruction or health-care decision that requires medically ineffective health 
care or health care contrary to generally accepted health-care standards 
applicable to the health-care provider or institution.”66 New Mexico,67 
Mississippi,68 Maine,69 Hawaii,70 and Alaska71 adopted statutes based on the 
UHCDA to protect doctors from rending futile care they believe falls below 
the acceptable standard. Oklahoma, however, has done the opposite; it has 
facially precluded a physician from refusing to render treatment that 
conflicts with her conscience.72 
C. The Right to Refuse Treatment vs. the Right to Demand It: Negative and 
Positive Rights  
There is well-established case law that a patient’s “negative” right to 
refuse medical treatment is cemented in the Constitution. This right to 
refusal stems from the concept of battery—touching others without their 
consent.73 The concept was eventually extended to consent in medical 
treatment, including LST.74 Out of medical futility, however, comes the 
question of whether people have a “positive” right to also demand 
treatment—even treatment that a doctor may find medically unnecessary or 
harmful. The right to refuse treatment was reinforced by the Cruzan and 
Quinlan decisions, where each court found it existed in the rights to liberty 
and privacy, respectively, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.75 The right to receive treatment, however, does not have a 
historic foundation like that of the right to refuse treatment.76 At least one 
                                                                                                                 
 65. BARRY FURROW & THOMAS GREANEY, BIOETHICS 446 (7th ed. 2013).  
 66. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(f), pt. 1B U.L.A. 118 (2005). 
 67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7 (West 2011). 
 68. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215 (West 2007). 
 69. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-807 (2014). 
 70. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-7 (West 2008). 
 71. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060 (2014). 
 72. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3090.3 (Supp. 2014).  
 73. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; In re Quinlan, 355 A.3d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).  
 76. William Prip & Anna Moretti, Medical Futility: A Legal Perspective, in MEDICAL 
FUTILITY AND THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS 136, 141 (Marjorie B. 
Zucker & Howard D. Zucker eds., 1997). 
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court has found that there is no right to receive futile treatment,77 but other 
courts have discussed the importance of self-determination in medical 
treatments.78  
The case that rejected the “positive” right to receive futile treatment was 
Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General Hospital. In Gilgunn, an elderly woman 
in poor health developed seizures that resulted in brain damage, leaving her 
comatose.79 While her family said she would have wanted everything done 
for her, meaning keeping her alive on life support through LST measures, 
the doctors went to the OCC of the hospital and entered a DNR on her 
chart.80 The hospital eventually took her off of the ventilator that was 
keeping her alive, and she died.81 Her family filed suit against the hospital 
and the attending physicians in Massachusetts Superior Court, and a jury 
found that the hospital and Gilgunn’s physicians were not liable because the 
treatment would have been futile.82 Although decided by a jury and never 
subjected to appellate review,83 Gilgunn rebuts the idea that a patient has a 
right to futile treatment. 
D. Historical Perspective of Physicians and the “Do No Harm” Principle 
From the beginning of the practice of medicine, the concept of medical 
futility has existed and been central to physicians’ ethical duty to their 
patients.84 Historically, the goals of medicine were directed more at 
improving or sustaining the quality of life rather than prolonging the 
duration of life.85 Hippocrates warned in The Art that “[w]henever the 
illness is too strong for the available remedies, the physician surely must 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and Professional Integrity: 
Finding the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 261, 276 (2008) (citing 
Gilgunn v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., No. 92-4820 (Mass. Super. Ct., Apr. 21, 1995)). 
 78. ALAN MEISEL, KATHY L. CERMINARA & THADDEUS M. POPE, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE 
LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING 13-18 to -18.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2010).  
 79. Halevy, supra note 77, at 276 (citing Gilgunn, No.92-4820).  
 80. Id. at 276-77 (citing Gilgunn, No. 92-4820); Moore, supra note 12, at 450-51.  
 81. Halevy, supra note 77, at 276-77 (citing Gilgunn, No. 92-4820); Moore, supra note 
12, at 450-51.  
 82. Halevy, supra note 77, at 277 (citing Gilgunn, No. 92-4820). 
 83. Id.  
 84. SCHNEIDERMAN & JECKER, supra note 9, at 6. According to the Hippocratic corpus, 
“three roles were prescribed for the physician: alleviating suffering in the sick, reducing the 
violence of their diseases, and refusing to treat those who were ‘overmastered by their 
diseases, realizing that in such cases medicine is powerless.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. 
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not expect that it can be overcome by medicine.”86 Doctors were expected 
to have knowledge of not only medicine itself but also the limits of 
medicine.87 Medicine has advanced and allowed people to live longer but 
arguably at the cost of lower qualities of life. Approaches to illness and 
disease became more aggressive, deriving from the mantras of “‘life is 
sacred’ and ‘preserve life at all costs.’”88  
These medical decisions have become less of a private matter between 
patients, their families, and physicians and have instead become a public 
spectacle.89 Often these events develop into a clash between right-to-die and 
pro-life advocates insisting that the outcome in an individual case affects a 
much larger, perpetual debate.90 This new view of physicians and state-
legislation constraints has negatively affected patients, as well as 
physicians.91  
Throughout all of this history, however, the primary principle in medical 
ethics has remained the same: “do no harm.”92 But what is harm? Medical 
futility has become such a controversial issue because harm has different 
meanings. While harm could refer to causing death to come sooner and life 
to be shorter, it could also refer to causing harm to the body—breaking it 
down, making it weaker, or causing a person to become less lucid or even 
vegetative through LST.93 Just like any other profession, physicians have 
ethical standards they must follow when treating patients.94 When a doctor 
decides to provide treatment to a patient, she must do no harm, but really 
she must decide which “harm” to avoid in the situation. The ultimate 
                                                                                                                 
 86. EMBRACING MORTALITY, supra note 9, at 118; SCHNEIDERMAN & JECKER, supra 
note 9, at 6. 
 87. SCHNEIDERMAN & JECKER, supra note 9, at 6. 
 88. Id. at 7. 
 89. Id. at 5. 
 90. Michael Ollove, ‘Life Preserving’ Law in Oklahoma Raises Questions for Doctors, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/16/life-preserv 
ing-law_n_3285324.html?utm_hp_ref=politics. 
 91. EMBRACING MORTALITY, supra note 9, at 123. 
Patients and patients’ families have been forced to endure and pay for 
inhumane, unwanted care either because of individual physician’s misguided 
notions of medical duty or the law or as a result of ill-conceived court 
decisions. Physicians have practiced ‘defensive medicine,’ fearing that 
anything less than mindless continuation of aggressive treatments would make 
them legally vulnerable. 
Id. 
 92. SCHNEIDERMAN & JECKER, supra note 9, at 6-7. 
 93. Id. at 18. 
 94. Id. at 6-7. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
598 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:585 
 
 
decision comes down to a quality-of-life judgment.95 The physician must 
use her medical training and professional ethics to make this decision, and, 
while patients and families deserve to have their input heard, ultimately the 
physician is charged to “do no harm.” Legislative bodies should not take 
away a physician’s ability to make this decision by forcing her to provide 
treatment unethical in her medical opinion.  
Patients and family members are often faced with guilt and blame, as 
well as an overwhelming wave of conflicting emotions when faced with the 
death of a loved one. This is why they cannot bring themselves to make the 
decision to end LST.96 With death, especially the death of children, comes a 
feeling of injustice, making it more difficult to discontinue treatment.97 This 
ethical dilemma makes the role of the physician even more important 
because, while physicians are emotionally invested in the fates of their 
patients, they are able as to act logical and unbiased decision makers who 
can understand what is at stake regarding quality of life.98  
E. How Advanced Directives Fit into the Oklahoma Landscape 
An advanced directive for health care in Oklahoma is a legal document 
that acts as clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s desires about how a 
person wants a physician to proceed when faced with possible use of LST.99 
In order to create an advanced directive in Oklahoma, a person need only be 
eighteen years of age and of sound mind.100 The Oklahoma Advance 
Directive form allows the signer to indicate in which situations he or she 
would like to receive, or not receive, LST; appoint a healthcare proxy; and 
designate anatomical gifts.101 These forms are extremely important because 
they can provide clear and convincing evidence of a person’s wishes in 
regard to LST.102 When doctors have no indication of what treatment, or 
lack of treatment, a person would want to receive, the doctors and the 
family of the person often struggle to make a treatment decision. However, 
if someone has executed an advanced directive, she guides her physicians 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 17-20. 
 96. Id. at 31. 
 97. Id. at 32. 
 98. Id. at 17-20. 
 99. What Is an Advance Directive for Health Care (Living Will), OKLA. BAR ASS’N 
(Oct. 2012), http://www.okbar.org/Portals/14/PDF/Brochures/advance-directive-2012.pdf. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Advance Directive for Health Care, OKLA. BAR ASS’N, at 1, http://www.okbar.org/ 
Portals/14/PDF/Brochures/advance-directive-form.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2016). 
 102. Id.  
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and family on this matter when she is able to voice her desires regarding 
LST.  
While it seems that an advanced directive provides greater clarity in 
medical decisions related to LST, the terms used in the Oklahoma advanced 
directive form are ambiguous and potentially confusing to laypeople, even 
though the legislature has attempted to define the words used. One 
provision lets individuals decide instructions for LST “[i]f [they] have a 
terminal condition, that is, an incurable and irreversible condition that even 
with the administration of life-sustaining treatment will, in the opinion of 
the attending physician and another physician, result in death within six (6) 
months.”103 Another option is “[i]f [they] have an end-stage condition, that 
is, a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which results in severe 
and permanent deterioration indicated by incompetency and complete 
physical dependency for which treatment of the irreversible condition 
would be medically ineffective.”104 While designed to encompass several 
different medical situations, the general language could pose a problem: 
these different categories are difficult for laypeople to understand as they 
may not know what medical situations specifically would fall into each 
category. Therefore, the lack of clarity in advanced directives may cause 
people to fill them out incorrectly, or deter people from filling them out 
altogether, even when they have strong beliefs about their medical 
preferences because they do not understand the paperwork.  
In the Barbara Howe case mentioned above, Howe created an advanced 
directive designating her daughter as her healthcare proxy.105 Howe made it 
verbally clear to everyone involved that “as long as there was any 
possibility left to communicate to her beloved family,” she wanted to 
receive LST.106 Although Howe set out these wishes, her physician and her 
healthcare proxy still disagreed on whether Howe was able to meaningfully 
communicate and thus whether she should continue to receive LST 
according to her statements.107 Therefore, while advanced directives and 
verbal wishes can help determine the intent of a patient, the actual 
application can still present problems, causing doctors and surrogate 
decision makers to disagree.  
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 2. 
 105. In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *2 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Mar. 
22, 2004); see Moore, supra note 12, at 434-35.  
 106. Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *11; see Moore, supra note 12, at 434-35. 
 107. Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *5; see Moore, supra note 12, at 433-35.  
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III. The Oklahoma Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act 
It’s getting almost to the point that you need a government 
permit in order to die in this state. 
— Marguerite Chapman108 
A. The Pro-Life Beginnings of the Act 
The Act was offered up to the Oklahoma House of Representatives as a 
pro-life initiative along with several other pro-life bills introduced in the 
same session.109 Based on legislation written by the National Right to Life 
Committee,110 and submitted for vote in a state in the “Bible Belt,” the bill 
faced little opposition or inquiry when brought before the floor of the 
House.111 In general, the outcome and the media frenzy of the Terri Schiavo 
case influenced the Act’s authors to write the bill.112 There was no debate 
on the floor of the House to show the conflicting sides of this usually 
controversial issue.113 When prompted by the only question asked about the 
bill before voting took place, Representative Dennis Johnson explained the 
bill in extremely simple terms, saying that it barred discrimination, but he 
seemed unable to answer the simple question about how the bill would 
actually function in practice.114 One is left with the impression that little 
research went into determining the possible consequences the bill could 
have.  
                                                                                                                 
 108. Ollove, supra note 90. Marguerite Chapman, a law professor at the University of 
Tulsa College of Law located in Oklahoma, made this comment about the state of Oklahoma 
when it passed the Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act. 
 109. See ArchOKC, Walk for Life 2013, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=trJ14YM6fDk [hereinafter Walk for Life 2013]. 
 110. Ollove, supra note 90. 
 111. Bill Information for HB 1403: Video, OKLA. ST. LEG. (Mar. 5, 2013), http://ok 
house.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=&clip_id=550&meta_id=24178 (Rep. 
Johnson and Rep. Sherrer at 00:10:34 to 12:47); Bill Information for HB 1403: Video, OKLA. 
ST. LEG. (Apr. 18, 2013), http://okhouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=& clip_id 
=590&meta_id=41099 (Rep. Johnson at 02:54:10-55:17). 
 112. Ollove, supra note 90. 
 113. Bill Information for HB 1403: Video, OKLA. ST. LEG. (Mar. 5, 2013), http://okhouse 
.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=&clip_id=550&meta_id=24178 (Rep. Johnson 
and Rep. Sherrer at 00:10:34 to 12:47); Bill Information for HB 1403: Video, OKLA. ST. LEG. 
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://okhouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=& clip_id=590& 
meta_id=41099 (Rep. Johnson at 02:54:10 to 55:17). 
 114. Bill Information for HB 1403: Video, OKLA. ST. LEG. (Mar. 5, 2013), http://okhouse. 
granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=&clip_id=550&meta_id=24178 (Rep. Johnson and 
Rep. Sherrer at 00:10:34 to 12:47). 
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Oklahoma has no state supreme court or reported appellate decisions 
concerning LST withdrawal or medical futility, so there is little guidance 
for the state on these issues. Often, medical futility disputes are resolved in 
some way before being brought to court and no actions regarding the Act 
have made it to court.115 This could be for many reasons. For example, 
physicians and patients, or their surrogate decision makers, could agree on 
the course of treatment regarding LST, and therefore disputes do not even 
occur. The Act, however, could be having a chilling effect on physicians, 
preventing them from broaching the subject of LST because, in a 
disagreement, a court will likely defer to the decision maker or grant an 
injunction against non-treatment. This effect may cause Oklahoma 
physicians to disregard any treatment, or non-treatment, that could present a 
difficult choice for the family, even if, in their expert medical opinion, it is 
the right treatment for the patient. While patients, their families, and 
physicians could agree in Oklahoma 100% of the time, that is probably not 
the case; a chilling effect upon Oklahoma physicians seems to be the real 
danger stemming from the Act.  
The general landscape of Oklahoma law favors continuation of LST in 
other ways as well. One Oklahoma statute—the Oklahoma Hydration and 
Nutrition for Incompetent Patients Act—creates an automatic presumption 
in favor of artificial nutrition and hydration if there is no clear and 
convincing evidence of the patient’s intent to the contrary.116 The statute 
says that artificial “[h]ydration or nutrition may not be withheld,” and 
prevents courts from issuing orders that withdraw artificial hydration and 
nutrition absent an exception under the statute.117 Since there have been no 
cases in the Oklahoma Supreme Court challenging this statute, we do not 
know if it would actually stand as it is, or how far it could even extend. This 
statute, however, contributes to the overall pro-life landscape of Oklahoma. 
B. Language of the Act 
The language of Oklahoma’s Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act is as 
follows:  
A. A health care provider shall not deny to a patient a life-
preserving health care service the provider provides to other 
patients, and the provision of which is directed by the patient or 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Medical Futility and Assisted Suicide, 20 J. 
CLINICAL ETHICS 274, 274 (2009). 
 116. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3080.4(A)(2) (2011). 
 117. Id. § 3080.4(C) (2011). 
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a person legally authorized to make health care decisions for the 
patient: 
1. On the basis of a view that treats extending the life of an 
elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of lower value 
than extending the life of an individual who is younger, 
nondisabled, or not terminally ill; or 
2. On the basis of disagreement with how the patient or person 
legally authorized to make health care decisions for the patient 
values the trade-off between extending the length of the patient's 
life and the risk of disability. 
B. In an action pursuant to this act, if the plaintiff pleads a prima 
facie case, the health care provider may defend his or her or its 
actions by pleading a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or 
reasons that provided a basis for the denial of treatment, subject 
to an opportunity for the plaintiff to plead that the reason or 
reasons for the denial of treatment are discriminatory in their 
application.118 
C. Ambiguity of the Discrimination Section 
The Act forbids doctors from denying LST based on their view that a 
patient’s age, terminal illness, or disability renders the patient’s life to have 
a “lower life value” from these factors.119 Few courts have addressed or 
defined any kind of medical discrimination so there is little guidance in this 
area. Further, the Oklahoma Nondiscrimination Act fails to employ any 
kind of “similarly situated” language or include any definitions explaining 
terms used in the statute including discrimination.120 The lack of this 
important language creates problems for the Act’s interpretation as it does 
not define discrimination, disability, or terminal illness, and it also does not 
identify how discrimination functions in the context of medical decisions.121  
The constitutional discrimination framework consists of protected 
classes, the determination of whether individuals are “similarly situated,”122 
                                                                                                                 
 118. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3090.3 (Supp. 2014). 
 119. Id.  
 120. See id. § 3090. 
 121. Id. 
 122. “However, citing Plyler, the Cleburne Court also used ‘similarly situated’ in 
describing the overarching concerns of equal protection, writing that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike.’” Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. 
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and the corresponding levels of scrutiny. When the government makes 
distinctions based on immutable characteristics, including race123 and 
national origin,124 courts will employ a strict scrutiny analysis. 
Additionally, courts employ intermediate scrutiny when the government 
draws distinctions based on gender.125 Finally, courts apply rational-basis 
scrutiny to government actions that make distinctions on other 
characteristics like age126 and disability.127 
Private parties, on the other hand, are statutorily prohibited from 
discrimination in the employment and housing contexts based on age, race, 
or gender.128 However, the same statutory framework and historical 
foundation does not exist for the characteristics of age, disability, and 
terminal illness for private parties in the context of medical treatment. 
While these kinds of characteristics are not relevant to employment or 
housing decisions, age, disability, and terminal illness characteristics can be 
relevant to medical-treatment decisions. These characteristics are 
considered when measuring test results and for diagnostic purposes, so it 
does not make sense to include these characteristics for certain medical 
determinations but exclude them from medical-treatment decisions. 
Another ambiguity is what constitutes “similarly situated” in this 
context. This concept is necessary in the discrimination context because, for 
discrimination to exist, individuals must be similarly situated for a 
discriminatory distinction to be made.129 In the medical context, however, 
two individuals will rarely have the same afflictions yet differ only in their 
age, disability status, or degree of medical illness. Medical determinations 
are extremely individualized, taking many factors into account. Thus, it 
would be difficult for a court to apply a traditional similarly situated 
framework to determine when discrimination has occurred in these cases. 
All of these undefined or blatantly absent components demonstrate the 
confusion in trying to understand the Act as a legal framework. But the 
ambiguity does not stop there. Indeed, the Act also fails to provide any 
                                                                                                                 
REV. 581, 612 (2011); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 
(1985). 
 123. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944).  
 124. Id. at 218. 
 125. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976). 
 126. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 309 (1976). 
 127. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442-43. 
 128. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012). 
 129. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 439. 
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guidance on how to actually apply it to the substantive characteristics that 
trigger it: disability, age, and terminal illness. 
1. Disability 
Several federal statutes already address discrimination based on 
disability in the context of federal programs and funds. Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act already prohibits discrimination by reason of disability 
“under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . .”130 Most U.S. hospitals and healthcare facilities receive 
federal funds through Medicaid and Medicare and are thus subject to this 
Act and may not deny medical treatment on the basis of that disability 
alone.131 But to receive the protection from section 504, an individual must 
be “otherwise qualified,” meaning the individual must actually qualify for 
the programs or activities provided by the public entity.132 Similarly, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) also prohibits discrimination 
against the disabled, even by private entities, and goes into great detail by 
defining discrimination, disability, and the entities covered.133 The ADA, 
however, has a very broad reach due to its coverage of private entities and 
contains no “otherwise qualified” requirement.134 Therefore, if the goal of 
the Oklahoma Nondiscrimination Act was to prevent discrimination against 
disabled individuals, then section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the 
ADA makes the Oklahoma Act redundant as to the disability prong.135 This 
is especially true because the Rehabilitation Act and ADA include clearer, 
more defined language than the Oklahoma Act.  
Additionally, the Act’s general ban on medical decisions based on 
disability ignores the fact that a patient’s disability plays a crucial role in 
dictating her medical treatment. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
discussion of disability discrimination in the context of section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act highlights this problem.  
                                                                                                                 
 130. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).  
 131. Phoebe Weaver Williams, Age Discrimination in the Delivery of Health Care 
Services to Our Elders, 11 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR L. REV. 1, 28 (2009), http:// 
scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=facpub. 
 132. 29 U.S.C. § 794; William D. Goren, Concepts Underlying the ADA and Key 
Definitions (Part 2), GPSOLO EREPORT (Sept. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publi 
cations/gpsolo_ereport/2012/september_2012/concepts_underlying_ada_key_definitions_par
t_2.html. 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 12131, 12182 (2012).  
 134. Id.  
 135. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN WITH 
DISABILITIES 62 n.12 (1989). 
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In Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Thompson,136 a case that originated in 
Oklahoma, the personal representatives of infants with spina bifida sued a 
hospital alleging discriminatory treatment.137 In their ruling on the 
discrimination claim, the Tenth Circuit borrowed from United States v. 
University Hospital.138 
[T]he term otherwise qualified cannot ordinarily be applied “in 
the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions 
without distorting its plain meaning. In common parlance, one 
would not ordinarily think of a newborn infant suffering from 
multiple birth defects as being ‘otherwise qualified’ to have 
corrective surgery performed.” The court reasoned, “[w]here the 
handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be 
treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say . . . that a 
particular decision was ‘discriminatory.’ ”139 
Thus, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the view that if a 
disability is related to the treatment being rendered, then refusing that 
treatment cannot be considered discriminatory. By prohibiting 
discrimination based on disability generally, the Act fails to acknowledge 
that disability can be relevant to medical decisions. 
 While the Act states that only “discrimination” based on a patient’s 
lower-valued life would violate the law, this is vague, and any actions that 
resembled discrimination could be problematic for physicians. University 
Hospital and Johnson show that a physician refusing treatment based upon 
a disability itself is not discrimination. But, in the case of the disabled 
patient, issues other than the disease or disability itself could be relevant 
when determining the best treatment option for the patient. The following is 
an example of this distinction regarding medical treatment:  
[S]uppose we have two patients with leg problems which we can 
treat at the same cost. The leg problems of one can be 
completely cured; the other will, even with treatment, limp for 
the rest of his life. The QALY140 value for the former treatment 
will thus be higher than that for the latter because the condition 
requiring treatment can more fully be cured in the former case. 
                                                                                                                 
 136. 971 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 137. Id. at 1493-94. 
 138. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 139. Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1493-94 (quoting Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156, 157). 
141. Quality-adjusted life-year. 
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Now suppose instead we must choose between unblocking the 
esophagus of a person with a healthy leg and another person with 
a limp, and that, if unblocked, both would have the same 
expected lifespan. Here the QALY values should be the same for 
both treatments even though the person with the limp suffers the 
same condition that results in a quality adjustment in the last 
example. Not being relevant to the condition under treatment, the 
limp is excluded as a personal characteristic.141 
Ultimately, while characteristics that are irrelevant to treatment options 
should not be a factor in treatment decisions, disabilities will often be 
relevant to treatment and should be considered when crafting a medical-
treatment plan. Although the writers of the Act may have intended to 
recognize the distinction highlighted above, that legislative intent and how 
the Act achieves that intent is not clear. Thus, because physicians often 
consider disability when creating treatment plans and the Act does not 
recognize the Tenth Circuit’s distinction between discriminatory and 
nondiscriminatory decisions made based on disability, the Act 
unnecessarily limits a physician’s ability to render proper medical 
treatment. 
2. Age 
Most federal statutory law addressing age discrimination only addresses 
discrimination against employees.142 But the Age Discrimination Act of 
1975 has broad coverage prohibiting age discrimination in relation to “any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”143 This law may 
preclude hospitals and doctors receiving federal funds from discriminating 
on the basis of age.144 Courts, however, have been divided on the issue.145  
The Oklahoma Act prohibits discrimination based on age in LST 
decisions.146 In making medical decisions, physicians must consider age as 
a factor when determining not only the quality of life or outlook of the 
patient, but also the treatment plan of a patient. It is obvious that a twenty-
five-year-old man and an eighty-five-year-old man have different health 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1515 
(1994). 
 142. Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 
1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 40 (1979). 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012). 
 144. Williams, supra note 131, at 28 n.154. 
 145. Id.  
 146. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3090.3 (Supp. 2014). 
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concerns and needs with regard to medical treatment. Age factors into 
medical treatment because the elderly have medical concerns such as not 
being able to heal quickly or recover as well after surgery.147 A physician 
may recommend surgery for a young person in order to extend his life—
balancing the harm to his body from the surgery against the positive results 
that would last throughout a long life. However, a physician may not 
recommend the same for an elderly person with the same ailment simply 
based on his age. It could take longer for an elderly person to heal, possibly 
exposing the patient to dangerous illnesses at the hospital, or high risks of 
serious side effects and may not improve life for very long. Thus, the risks 
of treatment could outweigh the benefits for elderly patients. The physician, 
however, would not decide to treat these patients differently out of the idea 
that the elderly man’s life was worth less than the younger man’s—what is 
suggested in the “lower value” portion of the Act—but rather out of the 
concept that the two must be treated differently because they have different 
medical concerns. The danger in the Act lies in the difficulty of arguing this 
position.  
3. Terminal Illness 
Discrimination based on terminal illness also does not have the same 
legal foundation as disability. Physicians may not believe certain LST is 
appropriate for those with terminal illnesses because they will not be able to 
recover from those treatments or the treatment will significantly impair 
their quality of life. A terminal illness is something that a doctor must take 
into consideration when giving treatment, not because she believes those 
with terminal illnesses have a lower life value, but because, if those 
treatments are applied, the patient’s life will be worse or of a lower quality. 
4. The Problem with Ambiguity  
While the Act states that treating patients differently “[o]n the basis of a 
view that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill 
individual as of lower value than extending the life of an individual who is 
younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill”148 violates the Act, physicians 
may struggle to defend against a discrimination allegation. This “lower 
value” concept present in the Act is vague and undefined. Does it mean that 
the physician looks at the patient and concludes that their life does not have 
the same value as another patient’s, or does it mean that the same physician 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Helen A. Thomason & Matthew J. Hardman, Delayed Wound Healing in Elderly 
People, 19 REVS. CLINICAL GERONTOLOGY 171 (2009).  
 148. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 3090.3. 
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looks at a patient and determines that, if given LST, that patient’s life will 
have a lower quality value? Even if a physician does not believe that a 
disabled person has less of a right to life than a nondisabled person, but 
simply gives them different medical treatment based on their different 
medical needs, it would be difficult for that physician to defend her actions. 
Since courts have not addressed or defined medical discrimination for most 
of these situations, there is little guidance from the court system in this area.  
D. Consequences of the Act: Intended and Unintended  
While it seems that the authors of this legislation had good intentions in 
creating the Act, under the plain-language interpretation approach, the Act 
could have devastating effects on the Oklahoma medical field. The text of 
the Act may force physicians to provide individuals with medical treatment 
even when that treatment is futile or harmful to that individual. When a 
physician encounters someone with a grave disease or someone at the end 
of her life, the physician is forced to make a value judgment, not 
necessarily judging the lives of these people as “lower in value,” but rather 
of low quality depending on the prognosis. The Act prohibits these 
judgments determining quality of life where they are simply natural for 
physicians to make. 
During floor discussion, the one question asked of Representative Dennis 
Johnson was whether the Act would apply to organ transplants, and he said 
that as far as he knew, it would.149 But, Representative Johnson did not 
seem to understand the gravity of the one question asked of him or how this 
Act would actually affect medical procedures such as organ transplants. 
Quality of life judgments are imperative in medical determinations, like 
organ transplants, where physicians consider the general health of the 
patient to determine who should receive an organ.150 Organ transplant 
centers often set their own age limits for potential candidates.151 This Act 
could invalidate those age limits and force transplant centers in Oklahoma 
to perform organ transplants on patients who may not only fail to qualify as 
candidates but also to survive the procedure itself due to age or illness. 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Bill Information for HB 1403: Video, OKLA. ST. LEG. (Mar. 5, 2013), http://okhouse 
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Furthermore, certain medical disabilities, such as schizophrenia, can make 
patients unlikely to adhere to the strict immunosuppression drug schedule 
required after an organ transplant.152 The inability to take all of the 
medication required for a successful organ transplant makes some patients 
bad candidates due to their prior medical conditions and disabilities.  
Physicians are sometimes the only ones who realize how certain 
treatments will affect their patients. Some families refuse to sign a DNR, 
saying that they want every available treatment for their dying loved one 
because they do not want to give up preserving every last moment of 
available life. They often fail to realize that if resuscitation is attempted, 
“ribs might be fractured, and [the patient] would be pushed, pulled, and 
defibrillated to no avail.”153 Providing this type of treatment for certain 
patients can certainly violate a doctor’s duty to “do no harm,” especially 
when physical harm is the only likely outcome or a when patient has a high 
chance of being revived only to exist in a persistent vegetative state.  
We have to face that as we age and diseases attack our bodies, we are 
able to do less. We are able to interact with the world in lessening ways 
until we are barely on the precipice of life, and when continuing to live 
causes great pain and suffering, life is not worth living. Ending treatment is 
a decision that pains family members, but these decisions are easier to make 
for physicians because they can objectively recognize this pain and lapse of 
human dignity and are also required to make these determinations regularly. 
Yet, Oklahoma is determined to take this input away from physicians, a 
choice that affects the morality of physicians and mandates prolonged 
suffering. Doctors should be able to refuse to give treatment when such 
treatment would fall below the acceptable standard of medical care to 
which they are held. 
The Act cripples the power and judgment of physicians by giving the 
family complete and ultimate veto power considering the end of LST. If the 
patient’s surrogate decision maker disagrees with the doctor as to the 
discontinuance of LST, the law clearly states that the physician must 
provide LST to that patient; if they do not, the patient or family can get an 
injunction to force the physician do so.154 There is no recourse or 
reconsideration by a committee. While other states with similar laws 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Defending Disability Discrimination, BIOETHICS (May 31, 
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 153. James J. Strain et al., Conflict Resolution: Experience of Consultation Liaison 
Psychiatrists, in MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING 
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qualify this provision to exclude care that would be futile, “[t]he Oklahoma 
law contains no such qualifier.”155  
In fact, the Act could cause a chilling effect on physicians. “Palliative 
care experts fear the new law will prevent doctors from having honest and 
candid conversations with patients at the end of life to make the medical 
condition completely clear and the various options and the ramifications of 
each.”156 Critics of the Act think that doctors may not inform surrogate 
decision makers about the risks of procedures because it could be construed 
as going against the wishes of the patient or proxy concerning LST.157 
Therefore, patients and proxies may not even be educated in making 
healthcare decisions because doctors are too afraid to speak up about how 
patients may be harmed by LST and not give them the option to discontinue 
treatment—even if it is the best option in their medical opinion.  
Public opinion on the discontinuation of LST indicates that the public 
does not fully understand how the treatment actually affects patients. 
Instead, the public focuses simply on the fact that LST discontinuation may 
hasten death. At a Walk for Life 2013 event sponsored by the Archdiocese 
of Oklahoma City, Kevin Calvey,158 the state vice chairman of Oklahomans 
for Life at the time, spoke about the “pro-life” bills up for vote.159 
Discussing the bill that has become the Oklahoma Nondiscrimination in 
Treatment Act, Calvey gave the following scenario as one in which the bill 
would function:  
Let’s say you have a doctor who is an atheist, and he thinks, ‘oh, 
you know, if you’re not gonna be walking around and talking 
and all that, you might as well kill yourself. So I’m not going to 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Ollove, supra note 90. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Kevin Calvey was a Republican member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives 
at the time this article was published, but was not in office at the time the Act was passed. 
Calvey has been outspoken on pro-life issues, including dramatically reacting to an 
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling against a proposed restrictive abortion law by saying, 
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the will of the people and the will of this body and protecting the least among 
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M. Delatorre & Leslie Rangel, Oklahoma Lawmaker Threatens to Set Himself on Fire Over 
Abortion Ruling, KFOR (Apr. 27, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://kfor.com/2015/04/27/state-rep-
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give you this treatment because I don’t think your quality of life 
is very good.’160  
Calvey called this disagreement in providing LST a “differing of 
philosophy” between doctors and patients or their representatives that does 
not give doctors “the right to put [people] to death.”161 He also called these 
decisions by doctors arbitrary and continued to use the phrase “put to 
death” to refer to the discontinuation of LST throughout his speech.162 This 
is an example of the distrustful attitude that portrays doctors as cold 
executioners, when really the situations where LST would be discontinued 
are dire and rare.  
Oklahoma is already in the top ten states with the fewest doctors per 
person and is ranked forty-third overall.163 Not only is there a shortage of 
doctors in one of the unhealthiest states in the country,164 but the Act may 
cause the doctors Oklahoma does have to leave the state. The Act could 
force physicians to perform high-risk procedures on patients, which could 
“put a physician in the position of murdering someone.”165 In fact, Dr. 
Jennifer Clark, an Oklahoma physician, said, “I know if this law had 
existed before I came here, I wouldn’t have come here, and I know many of 
my colleagues who are in advanced specialties, such as cardiovascular 
surgery, general surgery, cardiology and so forth, would question about 
leaving.”166  
Doctors are charged with determining what the acceptable standard of 
medical care is for their patients.167 That determination, as well as the 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
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decision whether to treat, should belong to doctors rather than surrogate 
decision makers as mandated by the Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act.  
IV. Alternative Laws and Approaches 
A. Idaho Medical Futility Statute 
Several years ago, Idaho was close to enacting healthcare legislation that 
would have allowed healthcare providers to withhold LST if they deemed it 
appropriate.168 In 2012, however, Idaho drastically changed positions and 
enacted legislation that prohibits healthcare providers from refusing LST if 
a patient or her surrogate decision maker requests it—unless the situation 
fits into a narrowly defined futility category.169 The statute reads: 
Assisted feeding or artificial nutrition and hydration may not be 
withdrawn or denied if its provision is directed by a competent 
patient in accordance with section 39-4503, Idaho Code, by a 
patient's health care directive under section 39-4510, Idaho 
Code, or by a patient's surrogate decision maker in accordance 
with section 39-4504, Idaho Code. Health care necessary to 
sustain life or to provide appropriate comfort for a patient other 
than assisted feeding or artificial nutrition and hydration may not 
be withdrawn or denied if its provision is directed by a 
competent patient in accordance with section 39-4503, Idaho 
Code, by a patient's health care directive under section 39-4510, 
Idaho Code, or by a patient's surrogated decision maker in 
accordance with section 39-4504, Idaho Code, unless such care 
would be futile care as defined in subsection (6) of this 
section.170 
The statute defines “futile care” in the following way: 
Futile care does not include comfort care. Futile care is a course 
of treatment: 
(a) For a patient with a terminal condition for whom, in 
reasonable medical judgment, death is imminent within hours or 
at most a few days whether or not the medical treatment is 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Idaho Anti-Futility Bill Signed into Law, MED. FUTILITY 
BLOG (Apr. 8, 2012, 3:46 PM), http://medicalfutility.blogspot.com/2012/04/idaho-anti-
futility-bill-signed-into.html. 
 169. Id. 
 170. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4514(3) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/4
2016]       COMMENT 613 
 
 
provided and that, in reasonable medical judgment, will not 
improve the patient's condition; or 
(b) The denial of which in reasonable medical judgment will not 
result in or hasten the patient's death.171 
This Idaho law, unlike the Oklahoma Act, provides an exception for 
futile treatment.172 Also unlike Oklahoma, the Idaho statute defines medical 
futility,173 although it is an extremely narrow definition allowing for very 
few exceptions. The problem with the medical futility section is that it 
defines medical futility with vague language and in such a way that few 
situations will fall under the definition. LST is effectively ruled out of the 
medical futility definition because, without it, death will necessarily occur. 
Denial of LST can also make death come quicker, taking LST again out of 
the medical futility definition. Futile LST could not include mechanical 
ventilation, resuscitation, or defibrillation under the Idaho law, as the lack 
of these would probably also hasten the death of a person. Therefore, prong 
(b) of the definition rules out denial of LST in most cases, and prong (a) 
limits the exception to patients so sick as to die within hours or a few 
days—narrowing this exception to an extremely small pool of eligible 
patients. Therefore, the definition of medically futile treatment in the Idaho 
statute allows for exceptions but quickly prohibits most futile LST through 
its narrow definition of medically futile care. 
Idaho set the precedent for Oklahoma for this kind of statute; however, 
Oklahoma took a more severe approach and refused to make an exception 
for medically futile care while also refusing to define medically futile care 
at all.  
B. Texas Advanced Directive Act (TADA) 
Texas has introduced a unique framework for LST disputes differing 
from most other states in the country.174 Not only does it take into 
consideration patient autonomy, but it also considers physician autonomy 
and gives a procedure for resolving these disputes through ethics 
committees, always offering the decision to transfer the patient to a facility 
willing to treat them.175 The TADA goes further than other state laws by 
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defining the procedure for LST disputes between patients/surrogate 
decision makers and physicians.176  
First, a hospital ethics or medical committee must conduct a 
review of the treatment dispute, with at least forty-eight hours’ 
prior notice to the surrogate decision maker, who is entitled to 
attend the review session. The hospital is also obligated to 
provide the surrogate with a detailed “Statement Explaining the 
Patient’s Right to Transfer” and may also provide an additional 
“written description of the ethics or medical committee review 
process and any other policies and procedures . . . adopted by the 
health care facility.” Once the review process is over, any 
decision shall be reduced to writing, which will be given to the 
surrogate and placed in the patient’s medical record. If anyone 
involved in the process disagrees with the outcome of the ethics 
committee’s review, the physician (with the assistance of the 
facility’s staff) shall try to transfer the patient to another 
physician, an alternative care setting, or another facility where 
the surrogate’s treatment decision can be complied with.177  
If a “duty to die” case is at issue, the statute provides ten days before 
treatment is discontinued during which a transfer can be sought.178  
The Texas framework attempts to resolve disputes between the family 
and physician rather than simply barring the physician from taking the 
action she deems appropriate or ethical given her medical training. The 
Texas method is less restrictive than the Oklahoma method and gives 
doctors the power to make decisions that correspond with their ethical 
conscience. The statute lays out the entire procedure that physicians with 
ethical objections must follow when advocating for discontinuing 
treatment, so as to satisfy due process. Laying out these procedures is 
extremely important because it gives both sides expectations. Some have 
come to distrust the medical community, but this framework mitigates that 
distrust by showing fairness to both sides. The physicians cannot simply 
override the patient or their surrogate decision maker’s wishes, but 
surrogate decision makers do not get the final say in the situation either. 
The disagreement goes through an ethics committee, which reviews the 
case and gives a recommendation. These unbiased third parties review this 
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information, like any hospital system would, and then make a decision, but 
there is no “death panel.” While an ethics committee may recommend that 
the LST be discontinued, the family can always try to find another facility 
to transfer the patient, and then both parties come out on top—the patient 
receives LST and the original physicians are relieved of the burden of 
performing treatment they deem unethical.  
Individual hospital procedures for handling ethical dilemmas vary 
widely, and the family does not always know what the process is for 
making these decisions.179 The legislature, by providing a framework, 
makes the system more transparent, thus making the process easier on 
medical professionals, patients, and their families. The TADA tries to 
protect doctors and their professional morality by allowing for a review 
process rather than barring the denial of LST altogether, like the Oklahoma 
Act.  
C. The Use of Ethics Committees to Make Decisions on Medical Futility—A 
Unique Tool 
Ethics Committees are qualified third parties who can make objective, 
ethical decisions regarding the denial of LST. In the TADA, Texas 
delegates authority to the ethics committees of the hospital where the 
patient is being treated. The committee then reviews the situation and 
decides whether an individual should continue to receive LST or whether 
that individual should not receive LST at that hospital anymore, thus 
triggering the ten days for transfer or cessation of LST.180  
These hospital ethics committees have different makeups of members. 
The advance directives law requires hospitals to convene ethics 
committees to resolve disputes that emerge when the patient’s 
family disagrees with a physician’s assessment that life-
sustaining treatment be discontinued. The precise composition of 
the committee is not dictated by law, but typically they are 
composed of medical professionals not directly connected with 
the case under review, clergy, social workers and community 
leaders. The patient’s attending physician is not a member of the 
committee but presents the medical case to the committee. This 
group of compassionate, informed and objective individuals 
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examine and assess the patient’s medical case to determine 
whether treatment should continue. Patient liaisons are usually 
assigned to families in these situations to help them navigate the 
process.181  
Individual hospital committees can have a better understanding of why 
the physician is recommending the discontinuation of LST than the family 
or a court. Ethics committees are often better forums for resolving disputes, 
like those over the denial of LST, because courts lack medical and ethical 
expertise to make these decisions.182 Courts expend time and money when 
considering the expert testimony required to hear these cases—assuming 
the family or patient can afford the expert in the first place.183 An ethics 
committee can also consider an LST case in a more intimate setting than a 
court, as issues are kept private rather than made public record in an 
adversarial setting.184 In addition, since ethics committees are not bound by 
precedent as courts are, committees can better consider these issues on a 
case-by-case basis.185  
The ideal Oklahoma statute would delegate decision-making power to a 
committee like this. The committee would be an objective panel made up of 
community members, physicians, and health administrators so as to 
incorporate many different perspectives. This group, acting as an objective 
third-party decision maker, could be more objective than representatives 
from the hospital where the dispute is occurring. Oklahoma could create 
one committee to consider all of the disputes statewide. This would also 
probably be ideal since each individual hospital ethics committee differs in 
composition, policies, and intent of the administration.186 It would probably 
be helpful for individual hospital committees to make a recommendation to 
this statewide committee in order to better resolve the process.  
D. Transfer of a Patient—A Win-Win for Both Parties 
If an ethics committee decides that LST should be discontinued, that is 
not the end of the issue in Texas. The most that TADA allows, if the ethics 
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committee decides that LST should not be continued, is a transfer to 
another facility.187 In rare situations, no other hospital or facility will take 
the patient because they believe it is unethical to treat the patient. However, 
if the family wants the patient to be transferred, that is usually possible.  
An example under TADA where transfer did not occur is Sun Hudson—
one of the very rare cases where the hospital removed a patient from life 
support against a family member’s wishes and without an advanced 
directive from the patient.188 Sun was born with thanatophoric dysplasia 
that caused, among many other medical problems, respiratory distress, and 
because his chest cavity and lungs would never grow, he would eventually 
suffocate to death.189 Sun’s mother190 opposed discontinuation of treatment 
and wanted him to continue to be on a ventilator.191 She was evaluated in a 
psychiatric facility but released, and she accused doctors in the hospital of 
wanting to murder her son because they recommended removing him from 
a ventilator and feeding tube.192 The ethics committee of the hospital 
considered this situation and found that Sun was in excessive pain from the 
fatal condition and, under the TADA, notified the mother that they would 
be removing Sun from treatment unless a transfer facility could be located 
within ten days.193 The hospital accommodated her by granting her several 
extensions when no facility could be found, and when she reached the end 
of her extensions, the hospital found her legal representation and even paid 
her legal fees.194 She sought an injunction to stop the hospital from taking 
Sun off of life support, and received relief for five months.195 Eventually, 
the probate judge ruled in favor of the hospital and found that, even if they 
kept giving her extensions, there was no reasonable expectation that another 
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facility would take Sun in for treatment.196 The hospital then removed Sun 
from life support, and he passed away.197  
This example shows that, unlike the picture painted by Kevin Calvey, 
hospitals and physicians faced with medically futile situations go through 
great lengths to do what is best for their patients, whether it is transferring a 
patient under TADA or even helping with legal fees. The Sun Hudson case 
also shows that if no hospitals will accept the patient transfer to their 
facility many members of the medical community probably agree that the 
quality of life of that person is low and would not wish to have any part in 
extending it.  
Oklahoma should allow physicians, as the TADA does, to use their 
medical training to make this decision and come to this consensus that it 
would be unethical to treat the patient, rather than forcing them to do so by 
acting against their morals. The current Act prohibits this. Oklahoma should 
adopt a new statute that allows physicians to decline treatment when they 
believe treatment would be medically futile and thus fall below the 
appropriate standard of care. The state should do this by putting ethics 
committees and a system of transfer in place, as well as adopting the 
UHCDA.198 
V. Conclusion 
There are worse things than death. While we do not know how the Act is 
affecting physicians or patients in Oklahoma, a plain-language 
interpretation of the Act would restrict the ability of physicians to make 
medical decisions that correspond to their professional ethics. While there 
is a right to refuse medical treatment, there is no corresponding right to 
demand medical treatment from physicians, and therefore physicians should 
only have the responsibility to provide treatment that corresponds with the 
standard of care—especially if LST would, in a physician’s opinion, not 
reach that standard. Supplying a framework for the ethical dilemma of 
discontinuing LST, as Texas has done with TADA, benefits both the 
patient, or surrogate decision maker, and the physician by providing 
expectations for dispute-resolution procedures and by establishing a fair 
decision-making process for a physician faced with an ethical dilemma.  
The historic goal of the medical profession to “do no harm” should 
continue to guide the decisions of physicians rather than the pro-life motto 
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“at all costs.” If the legislature allows physicians to do their jobs in an 
ethical way, public attitudes might change to view physicians not as those 






Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
